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Abstract
We analyze behavior on a TV game show where players’ earnings
depend upon several factors. Attractive players fare better than less at-
tractive ones, even though they perform no diﬀerently on every dimen-
sion. They also exhibit and engender the same degree of cooperative-
ness. Nevertheless, they are substantially less likely to be eliminated by
their peers, even when this is costly. Our results suggest that discrimi-
nation arises due to consumption value considerations. We investigate
third party perceptions of discrimination by asking experimental sub-
jects to predict elimination decisions. Subjects’ predictions implicitly
assign a role for attractiveness but underestimate its magnitude.
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1 Introduction
In a surprising and influential paper, Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) found
a substantial beauty premium in the labor market, of the order of 15%.
While there are several competing explanations for this premium, its source
remains an open question. Attractiveness may be correlated with unob-
servable productive attributes such as health, education or other types of
human capital. Attractive people may be more confident, thus enhancing
their social skills in the workplace.1 There may also be an element of reverse
causality – individuals who fare well in the labor market may have both
the ability and incentive (via greater self esteem) to invest in looking good.2
Perhaps the simplest (and least palatable) explanation is that beauty has
"consumption-value", either to the customers of the firm, fellow employees,
or the boss. The beauty premium in this case is a form of taste-based dis-
crimination, as discussed in Becker (1957). While anecdotal evidence on the
importance of consumption value considerations in the hiring of air hostesses
or waitresses certainly exists, the question remains whether this is a more
general phenomenon. More generally, as the literature on racial/gender
discrimination shows (see Altonji and Blank, 1999; Heckman, 1998), estab-
lishing discrimination and distinguishing between statistical and taste-based
discrimination is diﬃcult.
The main contribution of this paper is to disentangle the sources of
advantage to attractive people. We do this in the context of a TV game
show where participants are engaged in a variety of "tasks". We can ask: are
attractive people more productive, and do they exhibit greater confidence?
Are they more cooperative or do they engender cooperation? Are they
more likely to be chosen by their peers when a selection decision has to be
made? We are able to answer these questions since the game show has a
rich structure, with players being involved in a number of diﬀerent tasks
1See Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) for experimental evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
2Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) address the reverse causality problem in a study on
lawyers by using a measure of beauty based on photographs taken at law school.
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and decisions. It takes place over three rounds, in which players accumulate
"earnings" by answering quiz questions, and their earnings depend on the
accuracy of their answers, on how quickly they press the buzzer and also on
their "investment decisions". Earnings therefore depend upon ability as well
as a player’s confidence. This allows us to study the eﬀect of attractiveness
as well as other player characteristics upon performance. At the end of
each round, the lead player – the one with the highest earnings – decides
which one of the remaining players to eliminate. This allows us to study
the role of attractiveness and gender (in addition to performance) upon the
selection decision. After the final round, when only two players remain, they
play a prisoner’s dilemma game, allowing us to study the relation between
beauty and cooperativeness. The median stake in this prisoner’s dilemma
game is €1,683, so that the monetary consequences of players’ decisions are
substantial.
We find that attractive players fare significantly better than unattractive
ones. Players can only make positive earnings by making it to the final
prisoner’s dilemma stage of the game show. Only 27% of the least attractive
players make it to the final round, as against 49% of the most attractive
ones. This diﬀerence cannot be attributed to any aspect of performance –
attractive players fare no diﬀerently from unattractive ones in answering
questions or in investment behavior. They are no more likely to cooperate
in the final stage, and opponents also behave no diﬀerently vis-a-vis them.
Nevertheless, when one player has to be eliminated by the lead player, the
least attractive player of a show is significantly more likely to be chosen.
Our results support a "consumption value" basis for discrimination. Dis-
criminating in favor of attractive players is not simply used as a tie-breaking
rule between otherwise similar players. Unattractive players are more likely
to be eliminated even when they have a higher score than others. This is
costly to the lead player, implying an adverse selection in terms of earning
potential. We estimate that the average cost to lead players from discrimi-
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nation in the final round alone amounts to about €440, i.e. about 25 percent
of the median stake. This is an underestimate of the overall costs of dis-
crimination over all the rounds. In view of our finding that attractiveness
is unrelated to cooperativeness in the prisoner’s dilemma, this cost has no
oﬀsetting financial benefit.
It is noteworthy that we find discrimination against the unattractive on
a TV show, where each player’s performance is clear-cut and where the lead
player’s decision is subject to public scrutiny. Other studies using TV shows
(Levitt (2004), Antonovics et al. (2005) and List (2006)) find no evidence of
discrimination on the basis of race, gender or ethnic background, but some
weak evidence of discrimination against older players (these papers do not
examine the role of beauty). Discrimination on the basis of looks may not
be so imprinted in social consciousness as racial or gender discrimination,
so that people are not so aware of the possibility of discrimination, i.e. such
discrimination may be insidious.3 To investigate third party perceptions
of discrimination, we ran an experiment where subjects watched the game
show and had to predict elimination decisions. Our subjects predict that
attractive players are less likely to be eliminated, although they substantially
underestimate the magnitude of this eﬀect. We also ask our subjects to list
qualitative factors that influence elimination decisions, and find that very
few subjects mention attractiveness. Thus third parties appear to be aware
of the possibility of discrimination subconsciously rather than consciously.
We also present suggestive evidence that discrimination on the basis of looks
appears to entail less social opprobrium than racial discrimination, making
it easier to survive and persist.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
related literature. Section 3 describes the game show and our construction
of the measure of attractiveness. Section 4 analyzes behavior on the game
show, in terms of performance and cooperation. Section 5 studies the selec-
3 Insidious is defined as "working or spreading harmfully in a subtle or stealthy manner"
(answers.com).
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tion decisions by lead players and establishes that attractive players benefit
in this context. We also examine gender diﬀerences and find significant dif-
ferences in performance between men and women, with the result that there
does not appear to be any evidence of discrimination against women. This
section also presents our experimental findings on third party perceptions
of discrimination. The final section concludes.
2 Related Research
Following the work of Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), who find a beauty
premium in the labor market in a variety of occupations, several papers have
replicated its findings, and also attempted to disentangle the components of
the premium. Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) analyze a sample of lawyers,
and find a premium irrespective of their area of expertise, including the self-
employed. They argue that the most plausible explanation is taste-based
discrimination by clients. Mocan and Tekin (2006) find that unattractive
people sort into criminal activity due to the existence of a beauty premium
on the legal labor market.
There are two diﬃculties with field studies. First, data on attractiveness
is rarely available. Second, it is diﬃcult to disentangle attractiveness from
ability, since productivity is rarely observable. This makes it hard to estab-
lish whether the beauty premium is due to productivity or discrimination.
Such productivity eﬀects are sometimes present. Landry et al. (2006) find
that attractive female solicitors are more productive fund-raisers. Pfann et
al. (2000) study a sample of Dutch advertising firms and find that those
with better looking executives have higher revenues – this is particularly
pertinent for our paper, since it demonstrates that beauty plays a role in
the Netherlands.
Laboratory experiments are better suited to disentangling the sources of
the beauty premium, since they can be designed for this purpose. Mobius
and Rosenblat (2006) take this approach, using university students in Ar-
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gentina. They find that the beauty premium appears to be partly due to
the fact that attractive people are more confident. Since our results diﬀer
from theirs — we find that beauty is unrelated to actual confidence, as re-
flected in behavior, although it is correlated with third party perceptions of
confidence – we discuss their paper in more detail in section 4.1.1, while
presenting these findings. Benjamin and Shapiro (2006) find that experi-
mental subjects are able to predict the electoral fortunes of candidates on
the basis of 10-second silent video clips, suggesting that attractiveness (or
charisma) plays an important political role as well.
There is a large literature on discrimination on the basis of race or gender
(see Altonji and Blank (1999) for a survey). One diﬃculty in labor market
studies is in establishing discrimination – see, for example, the criticisms
of Heckman (1998). Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) conduct an field ex-
periment which circumvents these criticisms and shows convincing evidence
of employer discrimination against African-American names. However, it
remains an open issue whether such discrimination is statistical or taste
based, since employee performance on the job is not observable.
3 Description of the data
3.1 The game show
We use data from all 69 episodes of the game show ‘Does (s)he share or
not?’,4 broadcast in the Netherlands in 2002, with 345 contestants in total.
In the preliminary stage of the game, six prospective players choose their
initial capital, a number between one and 100. The player with the highest
choice is eliminated, leaving five players for the game proper. Figure 1 shows
the structure of the game.5
The game then proceeds with three quiz rounds, where players accumu-
4The name of the show in Dutch is ‘Deelt ie ’t of deelt ie ’t niet?’.
5The format of this preliminary elimination stage was slightly diﬀerent in the first few
episodes.
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Pre-stage
(initial capital)
Investment 
decision 
regular Q.’s
10 regular 
Q.’s
Investment 
and play 
Bonus Q.
Elimination
decision
Quiz round 1 Quiz round 3 Prisoner’s 
dilemma stage
Quiz rounds details
Quiz round 2
Figure 1: Timeline of the game show.
late earnings. Every round has ten regular questions and a bonus question.
Players first choose how much of their capital to "invest" in answering each
question (yi). Whoever presses the buzzer first gets to answer. A correct
answer yields yi, while an incorrect answer earns −yi. A player whose cap-
ital falls below his or her chosen investment may not answer any further
questions. Each round ends with a bonus question, where players compete
for the right to answer the question by choosing new investments. At the
end of the round, the player with the highest score at that point – the
lead player henceforth – must select one of the remaining other players for
elimination. An eliminated player has no further role in the game and loses
all of his or her earnings. The show then proceeds to the next round, where
all players start with a capital that equals the earnings of the lead player in
the previous round.
The last two remaining players play a prisoner’s dilemma game. Let E
denote the total prize money, which equals the sum of earnings of the two
finalists. The finalists simultaneously decide whether to share or to grab.
The monetary payoﬀs, as depicted in Table 1, correspond to a generalized
prisoner’s dilemma, where grab is a weakly dominant strategy.
Table 1 - Monetary Payoﬀs
Share Grab
Share 12E,
1
2E 0, E
Grab E, 0 0, 0
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Table 2 presents summary statistics of the game show and the players.
The total prize at stake varies between €380 and €26,600, with a median
value of €1,683.6 Players choose to share 43% of the time in the final
round. The age of players varies between 18 and 64 with an average of 34.4.
About a third of players is women. Of the third of the players who report
their occupation, one-third is student, while the others are drawn from all
the important sectors (at the two-digit classification level), including trade,
information technology, education, financial services and health.
Table 2 - Summary statistics, game show players
Mean Min Max
Mean age (years) (N = 345) 34.4 18 64
Percentage women (N = 345) 34.8 - -
Prize (€) (N = 138) 2,976 380 26600
Percentage sharing (N = 138) 42.8 - -
3.2 Measure of beauty
Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) argue that there are consistent standards
of beauty within and even across cultures, so that subjective evaluations
of attractiveness include a "common component". Our goal is to see how
this common component aﬀects performance on the game show. To this
end, each of the 345 participants on the game show were rated on a scale
from 1 (very unattractive) to 7 (very attractive) by approximately 10 raters,
balanced by gender.
Raters were recruited in public spaces to obtain a representative sample
of the adult population. Raters were on average 31.7 years old, which is
close to the average age of game show participants, 33 years. We recruited
120 raters, and each rated 30 participants. This was based on watching
short silent video fragments of the game show in which a player introduced
him or herself. We ensured that all five players on any show were rated
6These are considerable sums given that the median disposable monthly income of
a full-time employed person in the Netherlands was about €1,200 in 2000 (Statistics
Netherlands, available at www.cbs.nl).
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by the same set of raters, while varying the order in which the shows were
presented. About one-third of the raters were non-Dutch and could not
be familiar with the show, and only a small minority of the Dutch raters
indicated that they had seen any episode of the show. Given this, and the
fact that the game show was broadcast five years prior to the ratings, our
results are not distorted due to familiarity with the faces.
Our measure of attractiveness is the average of the independent ratings
(across raters) for each player.7 There is a high degree of concurrence on at-
tractiveness across raters. Across sub-samples of raters who rated the same
sample of players, the Cronbach’s alpha ranged from 0.70 to 0.85, showing
high agreement. Table 3 reports summary statistics of the ratings. Raters
were told to use the benchmark average attractiveness in the population at
4. Somewhat surprisingly, the average rating across participants is 3.51, i.e.
lower than the benchmark, so that there does not appear to be any positive
selection into the show according to attractiveness. Beauty is negatively cor-
related with age and women are, on average, rated as being more attractive
than men. Average ratings are more variable across women than men, con-
sistent with other studies (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994). We also coded
objective participant characteristics that are related to their appearance,
such as eye-color, hair-length, wearing of glasses, etc. These characteristics
are correlated with our beauty measure – for women, beauty is positively
correlated with hair-length, while for men, beauty is negatively correlated
with having a beard or moustache and wearing glasses. This suggests that
our measure of beauty captures aspects of physical attractiveness.
7Raters may have diﬀerent perceptions on the average beauty. To correct for such
diﬀerences, some other studies use standardized measures. Each rating is adjusted for the
mean rating of that rater, and is then normalized by dividing by the standard error (see
e.g. Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006). We chose to have many diﬀerent raters rating diﬀerent
subjects. The means are not comparable among raters, because the sample of episodes
they rated were partly diﬀerent. We therefore prefer to use the raw data. However, if we
standardize ratings for the subsamples of ratings made for the same players, the results
remain very similar.
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Table 3 - Summary statistics attractiveness
Mean (st. dev.) Min Max
All (N = 345) 3.51 (.69) 1.7 5.75
Men (N = 225) 3.45 (.63) 2.0 5.20
Women (N = 120) 3.62 (.79) 1.7 5.75
Age ≥ 34 (N = 177) 3.30 (.60) 1.7 4.80
Age < 34 (N = 176) 3.71 (.71) 2.2 5.75
Note: attractiveness of players is averaged across raters.
4 Beauty and Behavior
Given the many potential determinants of performance and monetary pay-
oﬀs on the show, we study each of these in turn.
4.1 Beauty and performance
We first investigate the relationship between beauty and performance in an-
swering quiz questions. The total earnings of a player in a round is probably
the most important measure of overall performance. The player with the
highest earnings becomes the lead player for that round, making the elimi-
nation decision. In the first two rounds the lead player’s earnings determine
the initial capital for all remaining players in the next round. In the third
round, a player’s earnings are added to the total stake, if he is either the
lead player or not eliminated by the lead player. Our focus is mainly on the
first round, since this is the round with the least prior selection.
Since players compete to answer each question, their performance in
the game is a relative measure. If there is a relation between beauty and
performance then this will depend on the composition of players within an
episode. Hence, we cannot draw conclusions from simple cross-correlations
over episodes. Instead, we look at the relationship between attractiveness
and relative ranking in the game. Two player positions, the first and the last,
are of particular interest. The player who is ranked first in terms of earnings
must choose one of the others for elimination, and cannot be eliminated
himself in that round. The last ranked player is an obvious candidate for
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elimination. We estimate a conditional logit model for the probability of
being in the first or last position conditional on participating in the same
episode. The conditional logit is a natural framework for modelling choices
from a set of alternatives. In our context, the alternatives are the players in
the round, and each player i in show j has a vector of attributes Xij (gender,
age, attractiveness). The conditional logit model has the form:
p(yij = 1) =
exp(β0Xij)P
i exp(β
0Xij)
for i = 1, ...5,
where yij is an indicator variable which takes value one when the player
is in the first (respectively last) position.8
The results are reported in Table 4, columns 1 and 2. In addition to at-
tractiveness, we also control for age and gender, and for a number of dummy
variables describing the register of the introductory speech: whether the
player mentions his marital status, whether he has children or not, talks
about his profession or studies, or about his hobbies. Attractiveness is un-
correlated with the probability of ending first or last. Only one covariate
turns out to be significant; players who mention their marital status are
less likely to be ranked first. To investigate further the correlation between
the players’ attributes and their rank in terms of earnings, we estimate a
rank-ordered logit model (a refinement of the conditional logit) that ex-
plicitly takes account of the ranking of players within a game and specifies
this ranking as a function of their relative attributes. The results are re-
ported in the third column of Table 4. We find no clear correlation between
any of these characteristics and earnings ranking. In particular, there is no
evidence that attractive people rank diﬀerently from unattractive ones.
8One important assumption for the validity of the conditional logit estimates is inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives. Our tests show that this assumption is not rejected.
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Table 4 - Attractiveness and performance, 1st round
(1) (2) (3)
Prob.
ranked
first
Prob.
ranked
last
Score ranking
end of 1st
round
Attractiveness .14 (.23) .18 (.22) -.06 (.12)
Age .00 (.02) .01 (.02) -.01 (.01)
Female -.32 (.29) .02 (.27) -.09 (.15)
Register of introductory speech
- is married / has a partner -2.17 (.75)*** -.30 (.54) -.16 (.28)
- children .67 (.45) .04 (.44) .08 (.24)
- study / profession .24 (.31) .09 (.31) -.09 (.17)
- hobby -1.70 (1.45) -.31 (.93) .09 (.49)
N. obs. 345 345 345
Pseudo R-squared .06 .01 -
Method
Cond.
Logit
Cond.
Logit
Rank-
ordered.
Logit
Notes: *** 1% significance level, in col (3), 1 is lowest score and 5 highest.
4.1.1 Decomposing performance
Performance in this game depends on a number factors: the choice of ini-
tial capital and investment, the decision to press the buzzer or not, and,
finally, the answer itself. These decisions depend upon the player’s ability,
confidence, and risk aversion. Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) argue that con-
fidence explains a substantial part of the beauty premium. They find that
"employers" have higher estimates of the productivity of more attractive in-
dividuals, even though they are given independent evidence on productivity.
An intriguing finding is that attractive subjects are estimated to have higher
productivity even when their interaction with the employer is only oral, not
visual. Mobius and Rosenblat attribute this to the higher self-confidence of
attractive workers, and this explains about 20% of the beauty premium.
In the context of this game, we would expect highly confident players to
be more active in the game in terms of investment and answering questions.
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Recall that by being the first to press the buzzer, player i faces a lottery
where he gets yi (his chosen investment level) if he is correct, and gets −yi
if incorrect. Let pi be the subjective probability assigned by i to his answer
being correct.9 Let xi be his current score, and let Vi(.) denote his expected
continuation value in the game after this question. It is optimal for player i
to answer to the question if his expected continuation value from answering
is weakly greater than his value at the current score. This implies that
player i will answer the question if pi exceeds a critical threshold:
pi ≥
Vi(xi)− Vi(xi − yi)
Vi(xi + yi)− Vi(xi − yi)
≡ p¯i,
where p¯i ∈ (0, 1) as long as Vi is strictly increasing in the player’s earn-
ings. Notice that the threshold value, p¯i, is larger if the player is more risk
averse, i.e. if Vi(.) is more concave. Since we observe the frequency of
correct answers for every player, we have an estimate of qi, the objective
probability that a player is correct conditional on answering. That is, we
have an estimate of E(qi|pi ≥ p¯i). A player who is more risk averse will have
a higher threshold value p¯i, and will therefore answer fewer questions but
be observed to answer a greater proportion of questions correctly. A player
who is more confident – i.e. has a greater value of pi for a given qi – will
answer more questions and will make more mistakes. In other words, risk
aversion and lower confidence act in very much the same way, in reducing
both the number of answers and also the proportion of incorrect answers.
On the other hand, if a player is less knowledgeable, and objectively has a
lower value of qi, this will ceteris paribus reduce the number of answers but
not raise the proportion of correct answers.
We concentrate our analysis on the decisions made in the first round,
since the second and third rounds could be subject to selection biases due
9As the player thinks about the question, his subjective probability will evolve over
time. The analysis that follows pertains to any instant of time, so the continuation value
from not pressing the button (Vi(xi)) includes the option value of waiting, and possibly
pressing the buzzer in the future, if no one else presses in interim.
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to the elimination decision.10 Table 5 presents the results of OLS estimates
of the determinants of initial capital, share invested, number of answers and
percentage of good answers (columns 1 to 4 respectively).11 We do not find
that attractive players are more confident. If they were, they should invest
more, be more likely to answer, and, conditional on answering, perform
worse. We do find a systematic diﬀerence according to gender: Women
are much less likely to answer a question. This is what you would expect
if women are more risk averse or less confident. However, conditional on
answering, they actually do not perform better than men, what you would
expect with risk aversion or lack of confidence. In the second round, we even
find that they are significantly less likely to answer correctly. We also did
not find any evidence that the topics of the questions could explain gender
diﬀerences in performance. Overall, these results suggest that the reason
why women are less likely to answer is not due to a wrong perception of
their ability or a higher degree of risk aversion, but rather because they are
less able to answer the type of questions on the show.
Our measure of confidence is based on actual behavior. It could be the
case that attractive players are perceived more confident by other players. To
investigate this, we constructed a measure of perceived confidence, by hav-
ing independent raters assess the confidence of a player on a 7 point scale.
Each player was rated by 5 to 10 raters, and each rater saw 35 players. Our
player specific measure of confidence is the mean across raters. Column (5)
of Table 5 shows the results of an OLS regression of perceived confidence on
the characteristics of the players. We find that perceived confidence is sig-
nificantly positively correlated with attractiveness. Thus, attractive players
appear more confident but do not behave more confidently. The reason for
10We have analyzed separately the decisions made for the bonus question. Again, we
found that attractiveness is uncorrelated with the share invested or the probability of
giving a correct answer. The results are not reported for the sake of brevity.
11Alternative econometric specifications (conditional logit estimates for the probability
of answering and logit estimates for the probability of answering correctly) give similar
results to the ones presented here.
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Table 5 - Attractiveness, performance and confidence, 1st round
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial
capital
Share
invested
N. of
answers
Share
correct
answers
Perceived
confidence
Attractiveness 1.29 (1.05) -.03 (.02) .00 (.01) -.01 (.03) .18 (.06)***
Age .28 (.09)*** -.004 (.002)** .00 (.12) -.002 (.002) .01 (.01)
Female -.02 (1.16) .00 (.02) -.50 (.17)*** .03 (.05) -.30 (.08)***
Register introductory speech
- is married/partner .02 (2.27) .04 (.05) -.50 (.22)** -.04 (.08) .03 (.15)
- has children -.71 (1.58) -.04 (.04) .17 (.21) .07 (.07) .09 (.14)
- study / profession 1.64 (1.45) .05 (.03)* -.02 (.18) .00 (.04) .17 (.08)**
- hobby -8.54 (2.92) -.04 (.06) .08 (.24) -.06 (.09) -.18 (.15)
Constant 33.98 (5.81)*** .90 (.10)*** 1.77 (.71)** .90 (.15) 3.36 (.31)***
N. obs. 345 345 345 271 3235
Notes: OLS estimates, * significant at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** 1% level, col (4)
include players who gave at least 1 answer. Standard errors are clustered by episode
in col (1) to (4). Col. (5) includes predictor fixed eﬀects and standard errors are clustered
at the player level.
our finding may be that players receive continuous feedback on their per-
formance. This contrasts with the set-up of Mobius and Rosenblat, where
subjects did not receive systematic feedback on their performance through
the experiment. We should also mention that in their study, there is no inter-
action between subjects who are assigned the role of "employers" and those
assigned the role of "workers", so that consumption value considerations
may be naturally less important.
4.2 Beauty and cooperativeness
Players can only materialize their gains in this game in the final stage,
where the two remaining players play a prisoner’s dilemma game and de-
cide simultaneously to share the accumulated money or not. A companion
paper (Belot et al., 2006) conducts a comprehensive analysis of the deter-
minants of sharing behavior. The key findings are that own characteristics
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matter – specifically, women are more likely to share than men. However,
the characteristics of the opponent turn out to be irrelevant to the sharing
decision.
We augment this analysis by including the player’s own beauty rating
and the opponent’s beauty rating as explanatory variables. The results are
reported in Table 6. We find no correlation between beauty and cooperative
behavior. Attractive players are no more (or less) likely to share – indeed,
the coeﬃcient is very close to 0.12 Attractive opponents are also no more
(or less) likely to induce sharing behavior from their opponents. This is
interesting – although our overall results suggest that players obtain con-
sumption value from having attractive co-players, they are no more likely to
share with them.13
It is possible that attractive people are perceived as being more coopera-
tive even though they are not really so, so that selection decisions are driven
by incorrect beliefs. While we do not observe the beliefs of participants on
the show, a companion paper (Belot et al. (2008)) experimentally inves-
tigates third party perceptions of trustworthiness. Experimental subjects
watched a random sample of shows and were asked to report a probability
that a player would share. Column 3 of table 6 reports our findings on
the relation between beauty and perceived cooperativeness. Our subjects
predict that attractive people tend to be slightly less cooperative, although
the eﬀect is small. It therefore appears that attractive people are not only
not more cooperative, they are also not perceived to be more cooperative
by third parties.
12The coeﬃcients are potentially biased if lead players use private signals to select
players, since the sample of unattractive players may be unusually cooperative. Belot et
al. (2006) addresses this issue and find no evidence of bias.
13Other experimental evidence on the relation between attractiveness and cooperation
is mixed – see Mulford et al. (1998), Solnick and Schweitzer (1999), Eckel and Wilson
(2004) and Andreoni and Petrie (2005).
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Table 6 - Attractiveness, sharing & perceptions of sharing
(1) (2) (3)
Pr. sharing Pr. sharing Perceived
prob. sharing
Own attractiveness -.03 (.07) -.04 (.06) -.031 (.012)**
Opponent’s attractiveness -.01 (.11)
Age .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .001 (.001)
Female .19 (.09)** .21 (.10)** .091 (.015)***
Contribution to prize money (%) -.72 (.31)** -.82 (.35)** -.066 (.032)**
Total prize (x €1,000) .03 (.01)** .03 (.01)*** .008 (.002)***
Constant .481 (.100)***
N. obs. 138 138 1672
Method Bivariate Bivariate OLS
probit probit
Notes: * significant at 10% level, ** 5% level and *** 1% level; (1) and (2) are
bivariate probit estimates, standard errors clustered by episode;
the marginal eﬀects in (1) and (2) are computed at the means of the lead
player’s characteristics. (3) includes subject fixed eﬀects.
5 Beauty and selection
We now study the elimination / selection decision, having established that
there is no objective reason to discriminate in favor of attractive players
either on the grounds of performance or because they are (thought to be)
more cooperative. Thus any bias towards attractive players in lead player
selection decisions can plausibly be attributed to the lead players obtaining
consumption value from having attractive co-players.
An important advantage of the rules of our game show is that in mak-
ing the elimination decision, the lead player in any round is faced with a
relatively simple decision problem, rather than a game. If the lead player
chooses to eliminate player i then the lead player is decisive and i will play
no further part in the game. In contrast, elimination decisions in other game
shows (such as The Weakest Link, analyzed by Levitt (2004) and Antonovics
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et al. (2005)) are often made by majority voting, involving all the partici-
pants remaining at that stage. If a player j votes to eliminate i, then i may
not be eliminated, and may in turn vote against j at a later stage. This
implies that players have a strong incentive to vote to eliminate whoever
they think others are going to vote against. In other words, there are mul-
tiple voting equilibria, and this is coupled with a strategic dynamic motive
to vote with the majority. This may induce a significant role for irrelevant
characteristics as possible focal points, even when players do not have any
preference for discriminating on the basis of such a characteristic. In the
context of our game, these strategic considerations do not apply, since only
the lead player votes and his vote is decisive. Thus evidence of discrimination
can be attributed to lead player preferences.
Figure 2 shows the average attractiveness of all players in each round,
and that of the players who are eliminated in that round. In each round,
eliminated players are less attractive than average, and in consequence, av-
erage attractiveness increases steadily over the rounds. Other summary
statistics confirm this picture. If a player is average-looking (i.e. within one
standard deviation of the mean), he or she has 0.4 probability of reaching
the final round. An attractive player has a substantially higher probability
of 0.51, while an unattractive player’s probability is only 0.31 (see Table 7).
Table 7 - Attractiveness and survival, by round
% reaching % reaching % reaching
round 2 round 3 final
Attractive 83 62 51
Average-looking 81 62 40
Unattractive 72 52 31
Note: Attractive (unattractive) is more than one standard
deviation above (below) the mean.
We investigate in more detail the role of physical attractiveness in the
selection decision by the lead player by estimating a conditional logit model,
where the dependent variable indicates whether the player was eliminated
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Figure 2: Average beauty of all players and eliminated players.
(1) or not (0). We start by focusing on the first round, where the sample
is largest and no selection has taken place. Later on we discuss results for
other rounds.
The results are shown in Table 8. The first regression includes no other
covariates, the second controls for performance and individual characteristics
and the third controls for measures of confidence. The results are reported
in terms of odds ratios with a reference value of 1. These have an easy
interpretation. An odds ratio above (below) 1 signifies that the attribution
increases (decreases) the probability of being eliminated.
We find that unattractive players are significantly more likely to be elim-
inated than average-looking players. When we control for performance and
measures of confidence, we predict that unattractive players should be three
times as likely to be eliminated as average-looking players. In contrast we
do not find that more attractive players are better treated. Hence, our re-
sults point in the direction of an ugliness penalty, in line with the results of
Hamermesh and Biddle (1994).
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Table 8 - Probability of being eliminated, 1st round
Conditional logit estimates (odds ratios)
(1) (2) (3)
Attractiveness
Unattractive 2.37 (1.05)* 2.91 (1.43)** 3.11 (1.57)**
Attractive 1.29 (.39) 1.21 (.44) 1.15 (.43)
Performance
Fourth highest .47 (.15)** .42 (.14)***
Third highest .26 (.10)*** .23 (.09)***
Second highest .18 (.08)*** .16 (.08)***
Confidence
% capital invested .43 (.33)
n. answers .98 (.13)
perceived confid. 1.22 (.38)
Female .67 (.21) .70 (.24)
Age 1.00 (.02) 1.00 (.02)
Controls for topic
registry introduction no yes yes
N. obs. 276 276 276
Pseudo R-squared .02 .20 .20
Notes: Significance levels: *: 10 percent, **: 5 percent, ***: 1 percent.
Note that age and gender are irrelevant in the selection decision. Also,
the score ranking is a very good predictor of elimination: the player with
the lowest score (the reference category) is more than twice as likely to be
eliminated as the one ranked fourth, and more than five times as likely to
be eliminated as the one with the second highest score. Finally, controls for
behavior during the game do not change the results and do not matter as
such in the selection decision (column (3)). Less attractive players are dis-
criminated against, for reasons that are uncorrelated with their performance
or behavior during the game.
5.1 Discrimination over the rounds
One explanation for the discrimination taking place in the first round is that
players have very little information about each other. They had relatively
little time to get to know each other and to learn about each other’s ability.
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With so little information, perhaps they retreat to attractiveness to select
one player over another.
If this is the reason, we expect discrimination to disappear over the
rounds when more information becomes available. However, since discrimi-
nation takes place in the first round, the population of players becomes more
attractive on average and less heterogeneous, which should reduce discrimi-
natory practices. The fact that there are fewer unattractive people around
also makes it harder to identify an eﬀect. So we also propose a specification
based on a relative measure of beauty, where we identify the least attractive
player among the remaining contestants with a dummy variable.
The first two columns of table 9 show estimation results comparable to
column (3) of Table 8, for the second and third round respectively. Columns
(3) to (5) show the results for the specification including the dummy for the
least attractive player for each round, including the first one.
We find no evidence of discrimination based on attractiveness in the
second round. Gender is the best predictor of the elimination decision in
the second round, with women being substantially more likely to stay in the
game. We will come back on that point in the next section. In the third
round, we find evidence of discrimination against the least attractive player,
and the coeﬃcient is comparable to the first round. So discrimination does
not disappear with learning about player ability.
Table 9 - Probability of being eliminated in 2nd and 3rd round
Conditional logit estimates (odds ratios)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Round 2 3 1 2 3
Unattractive .63 (.35) 1.02 (.84)
Attractive .69 (.31) .43 (.26)
Least attractive 2.16 (.67)** 1.00 (.33) 2.34 (.92)**
N. obs. 207 138 276 207 138
All regressions control for the same variables as Table 8, col. (3), ** indicates
significance level at 5 percent
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5.2 Gender diﬀerences in discriminatory behavior
We now explore the nature of discrimination in greater detail. We investigate
the relation between discrimination and gender. Do men care more about
looks than women do? Do people care more about the looks of the opposite
sex? Table 10 reports separate regressions for male and female lead players.
We find that women do discriminate more against the least attractive player
than men do, i.e. women seem to care more about looks than men do.
The diﬀerence in coeﬃcients between male and female lead players is not
significant though. Columns (3) and (4) investigate the elimination decision
when the lead and least attractive player are of opposite sex on the one hand,
and of the same sex on the other hand. We find that discrimination is indeed
greater when the candidates for elimination are of the opposite sex. The
diﬀerence in coeﬃcients is significant at the 10% level. This could explain
why women discriminate more, since the least attractive player in the first
round is more likely to be a man (men being on average less attractive than
women). We have found almost identical results for the last selection round,
where the discrimination against the least attractive player took place in
games where the lead player and the least attractive player were of opposite
sex (results not reported for the sake of brevity). Since in the last round,
most lead players are men, the discrimination plays mostly against women.
Overall, these results reinforce the idea that beauty has a consumption
value, and that this is the main reason why people discriminate against less
attractive players.
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Table 10: Discrimination and gender of the lead player (1st round)
Conditional logit estimates (odds ratios)
Lead player
female
Lead player
male
Lead player
and least
attractive -
opposite sex
Lead player
and least
attractive -
same sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fourth highest score .24 (.18)* .50 (.18)* .36 (.19)** .53 (.23)
Third highest score .24 (.19)* .39 (.16)** .51 (.25) .18 (.11)***
Second highest score .21 (.15)** .13 (.08)*** .31 (.16)** .05 (.05)***
Least attractive 4.55 (3.11)** 1.39 (.48) 2.80 (1.19)** 1.10 (.53)
Age .95 (.04) 1.01 (.02) .98 (.02) 1.03 (.03)
Gender .93 (.67) .70 (.24) .68 (.31) .56 (.27)
N. obs 84 192 140 136
Test equality coeﬃcients
for the least attractive
(1) = (2) P-value
(3) = (4) P value
.10
.16
Notes: Equality of coeﬃcients is tested with a generalized Hausman test
Significance levels: *: 10 percent, **: 5 percent, ***: 1 percent.
5.3 Costs of discrimination and the benefits of beauty
We now provide an estimate of the benefits of beauty and the costs of dis-
crimination. As in many other game shows, the rules are such that most
contestants go home empty handed. In fact, only 59 out of 345 contestants
(i.e. 18%) take any money home. Moreover, even among those with pos-
itive earnings, the variance is very large (the standard deviation is €2,758
compared to the mean of €2,570). These factors imply that there is a high
degree of noisiness in earnings, making it a priori diﬃcult to get statistically
significant results. Furthermore, given the large number of zeroes, our esti-
mates are not directly comparable to estimates of the beauty premium from
the labour market such as those of Hamermesh and Biddle (1994).
Column 1 in table 11 presents OLS estimates of the determinants of log
earnings. An increase in attractiveness of one standard deviation increases
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earnings by 41 percentage points. Despite the large standard error, this is
significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level. An alternative estimate of
the beauty premium is based on estimating the probability of reaching the
final round. Columns 2 and 3 provide estimates of the probability of reaching
the final round with attractiveness as a continuous variable (column 2) or
as a discrete variable, based on the ranking of players within each show
according to attractiveness (column 3). The results confirm our previous
findings: the two most attractive players are about twice as likely to reach
the final round than the least attractive player (50% against 27% with a
standard error of 8 percentage points). This means that, on average, their
expected earnings are twice as large. Note that if we take a very conservative
approach and consider the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for
the probability of reaching the final round, we still have a diﬀerence of 7
percentage points in terms of probability of reaching the final round between
the most and least attractive players. In this case, the estimated lower bound
on the beauty premium equals 9%, which remains substantial.
Table 11 : The beauty premium
Log earnings Probability of reaching final round
(1) (2) (3)
Gender -.46 (.31) 1.07 (.23) 1.12 (.24)
Age -.005 (.018) .98 (.01) .98 (.01)
Attractiveness .41 (.24)* 1.42 (.26)*
Beauty rank 5 (least attractive) - -
Beauty rank 4 1.57 (.52)
Beauty rank 3 1.29 (.45)
Beauty rank 2 2.14 (.73)**
Beauty rank 1 (most attractive) 1.89 (.64)**
Constant .15 (1.13)
N. Obs. 345 345 345
Pseudo R-squared .01 .03 .04
Notes: Col. (1): OLS estimates allowing for a show-specific random eﬀect; Cols (2)
and (3): conditional logit estimates (odds ratios); **: 5 percent, *: 10 percent.
Turning to the costs of discrimination, stakes are substantial on the
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game show. By eliminating the least attractive players instead of players
who would maximize their monetary payoﬀ, players implicitly pay a price
for keeping more attractive players in the game. While we cannot directly
calculate the price for keeping more attractive players in the game in the
first or second round (since we do not observe the earnings of those who are
eliminated), we can do a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the price they
pay by eliminating the least attractive player in the third round, where we
do observe perfectly the earnings of the contestants. However, the sample of
observations is relatively small and the results should be taken with caution.
We can identify 10 of the 69 episodes where the lead player eliminates
the least attractive player, even though he does not have the lowest score. In
these episodes, the less attractive players have earned €440 more on average
than the player who is chosen to play the final. Hence, by eliminating
the least attractive players in these cases, the lead player diminishes the
prize money E by €440 on average.14 Notice that discrimination is directly
financially costly in the final round – there are only two instances where the
two low ranked players had the same score. This estimate is a lower bound
since we are only looking at costs associated with discrimination in the third
round, and not earlier rounds, since a precise imputation of financial costs
in earlier rounds is more diﬃcult.
5.4 Gender diﬀerences
It is worthwhile contrasting our results on beauty with diﬀerences between
players based on gender. Overall, women earn less than men, earning €269
on average, as compared to €428. As with attractiveness, we can decompose
the gender gap in earnings into diﬀerent components. In terms of perfor-
mance, we found that women were less likely to answer a question, and
conditional on answering were no more likely to answer correctly (in round
14 It might be that lead players expect those with a lower score to be more cooperative,
for which there is evidence (in our companion paper). But this doesn’t explain why the
player with a lower score is rarely chosen to play the final if he is is the least attractive
player.
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3, they are actually less likely to answer correctly). The lower performance
of women could be due to the competitive character of the game show –
Gneezy et al. (2003) present experimental evidence showing that women
perform worse in competitive environments, especially when they compete
against men.
Despite the fact that women perform worse, they are as likely to reach
the final round as men – 35% of the participants on the show are women,
while 37% of the players in the final round of the game are female. One
explanation for discrimination in favour of women in the selection decision
is their greater cooperativeness, since women are more likely to share in the
final round – 55% of women share against only 36% of men. However, this
does not seem to be the explanation since women are no more likely to be
selected than men in the last round (holding earnings constant), when the
lead player selects the player with whom he will play the final round and
where one may expect cooperativeness considerations to be dominant.15 It
is more plausible that women are chosen despite their lower performance due
to gender balance considerations (since women are relatively scarce in the
show)16 or positive discrimination (since the selection decision is public).
Women’s’ greater cooperativeness widens the gender gap in earnings. In-
deed, since women are much more likely to share in the final round, and since
the opponent does not share more often when facing a woman, the diﬀer-
ence in take-home earnings across gender is larger than between individual
scores.
Overall, we find no evidence of negative discrimination against women.
The gender earnings gap is mainly driven by diﬀerences in performance
and cooperativeness. Perhaps the fact that the selection decision is public
prevents gender discrimination – since gender is an objective and obvious
15Our companion paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of the
sharing decision in the final stage, and its implications for how selection decisions are
made just before this.
16Some participants explicitly mentioned "gender balance" as a consideration while
making the selection decision in the second round.
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characteristic in contrast to attractiveness, which is more subtle.
5.5 Insidious discrimination?
Are third parties aware of the possibility of discriminatory behavior? And
if they are aware, is this knowledge conscious or sub-conscious? These ques-
tions are relevant – if discrimination is not perceived by third parties, it
may persist even under public scrutiny.17 To investigate these questions,
we adopt a novel experimental procedure, by asking subjects to predict the
elimination decision at the end of the first round of quiz questions. We focus
on the first round since we do not want subject predictions to be influenced
by learning from observing selection decisions in previous rounds. Our sub-
jects (71 students from the University of Amsterdam) were shown a trailer
and given a handout, setting out the overall structure of the game show,
and then shown a random sample of seven episodes. They were informed
in advance of the identity of the lead player in the first round, so that they
could focus on predicting the lead player’s decision. The subject was asked
to assign a probability to the event that each of the other players would be
chosen for elimination by the lead player. Subjects were rewarded by using
a quadratic scoring rule, giving them strict incentives to report their true
beliefs. Subjects were not informed of the actual elimination decision in
any episode, so as to prevent any learning. At the end, we asked subjects a
qualitative question: what, in their opinion, are the most important factors
determining the elimination decision? Subjects were permitted to list up to
four such factors.18
Table 12 reports ordinary least squares estimates, where the dependent
variable is the prediction of subject i regarding the elimination probability
17This is related but not identical to the notion of implicit discrimination (see Greeen-
wald et al. (1998) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2005)), which uses psychological
tests to measure implicit bias, say against African-Americans. It is worth noting that
researchers have found an implicit bias against older people and the overweight.
18The subjects also filled out a questionnaire on their background characteristics. They
earned on average €18 (for 90 minutes), including a €4 show up fee. The full set of
instructions is in the appendix.
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of player j.We have 71 subjects, making predictions for four players in each
of seven episodes, giving us 1988 observations.
Table 12 - Predictions of elimination in 1st round
OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attractiveness -2.58 -2.43 -2.45
(1.03)** (.84)*** (.84)***
Dummy least attractive 2.24 2.38 2.42
(1.55) (1.29)* (1.29)*
Perceived confidence .20 .20
(.18) (.17)
Age -.09 -.03 -.03 -.04 .02 .01
(.07) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.06)
Gender -3.58 -3.58 -3.52 -3.96 -3.91 -3.85
(1.39)*** (1.11)*** (1.11)*** (1.38)*** (1.10)*** (1.10)***
Score rank 4th -6.76 -6.74 -6.83 -6.81
(1.37)*** (1.37)*** (1.36)*** (1.36)***
Score rank 3d -5.22 -5.21 -4.87 -4.86
(1.37)*** (1.37)*** (1.36)*** (1.36)***
Score rank 2d 8.41 8.42 8.61 8.62
(1.73)*** (1.72)*** (1.74)*** (1.74)***
Constant 38.29 36.71 35.95 26.98 25.93 25.08
(5.19)*** (4.46)*** (4.50)*** (2.63)*** (2.27)*** (2.45)***
N. Obs. 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by player. Significance levels: *: 10 percent,
**: 5 percent, ***: 1 percent.
Our main finding is that our subjects do perceive that less attractive
players are more likely to be eliminated.19 That is, our subjects are at
least implicitly aware that discrimination on the grounds of attractiveness
is likely to occur. They predict that an increase in one standard deviation
in attractiveness should decrease the probability of being chosen by 1.7 per-
centage points. This is substantially less than what we have estimated in
19Subjects do not perceive any relation between a player’s confidence (as assessed by the
subject) and the probability of elimination. Women are predicted to be more likely to be
eliminated, as are second ranked players — neither of these eﬀects are present in the actual
selection decision. The last finding appears to be due to subjects incorrectly thinking that
the first ranked player may have an incentive to eliminate rivals for leadership.
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the actual data (the corresponding number is 9 percentage points). Inter-
estingly, attractiveness is not mentioned by anyone among the two most
important criteria influencing the selection decision, and only 4 subjects list
attractiveness at all. This provides suggestive evidence that discrimination
is insidious, since subjects appear to be implicitly aware of its existence,
but not consciously so. This is particularly noteworthy since a subject is
detailing the motivations of players on the game show (rather than him-
self), and would therefore have little psychological reason to lie or practice
self-deception.20
Discrimination on the basis of looks appears to meet with less social dis-
approval than other forms of discrimination. Following a report in New Sci-
entist summarizing the findings of the present paper, it was covered by news-
papers in several countries including the UK and the Netherlands. Press
coverage in the Dutch newspaper “De Telegraaf” triggered a large public
response – within a day, 156 readers had posted a response on the newspa-
per’s website. We coded these responses and found that 36 of these suggested
that beautiful people "deserve" to be treated better than the "ugly" – some
comments were quite oﬀensive about unattractive people. 21 people simply
acknowledged the results and gave further examples of discriminatory behav-
ior against ugly people. Only six people explicitly condemned this kind of
discriminatory behavior. Furthermore, many people simply found the find-
ings somewhat amusing (as did some of the articles in the popular press),
rather than a matter for social concern. While its readers are unlikely to
be representative, the newspaper is the largest with over 700,000 circulated
copies daily. It is noteworthy that we find this response in the Netherlands,
a country that is well known for its progressive and liberal attitudes towards
some minority groups (e.g. gay people), and one with a strong commitment
to equal opportunities.
Our experimental findings (and the public response) raise important is-
20Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) find that experimental subjects who discriminate seem
to be unaware that they do so.
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sues of social concern regarding the persistence of discrimination. Following
Becker (1957), economists have focused on the extent to which the forces of
competition and profit maximization eliminate discrimination. It is arguable
that the social stigma associated with racial or gender discrimination is no
less important a force in its elimination. To the extent that discrimination
on the basis of looks or age occurs, but is either insidious or is "acceptable"
even when perceived, its persistence is enhanced.
5.6 External validity
One possible concern with our study is external validity, especially if the
participants on the show are not representative of the population. While
genuine field data on attractiveness and individual productivity might be
ideal, this is hard to get, and laboratory experiments or our type of study
seem to oﬀer the best hope for disentangling the beauty premium.21 The
producer of the show told us that no explicit criteria were used in recruit-
ing participants – in particular, applicants were not required to submit a
photograph, so that the producers do not seem to have been concerned with
having good looking people. Nor does it seem, from viewing the show, that
attractive people self-select into the show. This impression is confirmed by
the fact that the average rating of our participants in terms of attractive-
ness is 3.51, whereas raters were told to use 4 as the benchmark for average
attractiveness. Participants also come from a variety of occupations, an
advantage that compares favorably with laboratory experiments. Given the
lack of emphasis by the producers on attractiveness, it appears unlikely
that participants’ behavior on the show reflects an internalization of such
concerns.
In view of our findings, it is also relevant that Dutch society seems less
concerned with beauty than other similar societies. Spending on cosmetics
and toiletries as a proportion of GDP is lower in the Netherlands than most
21Harrison and List (2004) have an extensive discussion on the external validity of game
show data.
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other West European countries – the Netherlands is (joint) fourth from the
bottom in the list of the EU fifteen.22 The fact that we find discrimination
in such a context seems particularly compelling.
6 Concluding comments
To summarize, our main finding is that beauty is "only skin-deep", and has
no implications for a person’s performance or their cooperativeness. Nev-
ertheless, it is an attribute well worth having. Attractive players earn a
premium, that arises from the reluctance of other players to eliminate them.
This seems to reflect consumption value considerations on the part of the
other players in the game. The preference for the beautiful is therefore a
form of taste based discrimination. Our finding is also noteworthy since
participants on a TV show would be reluctant to discriminate, since their
behavior is subject to public scrutiny. While discrimination on the basis
of gender or race are rightly frowned upon, discrimination based on a per-
son’s physical appearance is less remarked upon. Indeed, it is likely that
discriminators, the discriminated against and third parties are less aware of
the phenomenon, so that it is, to some extent, insidious. Our experimental
evidence on third-party perceptions of discrimination is suggestive in this
regard. We believe that discrimination on the basis of less obvious criteria
such as attractiveness is likely to have qualitatively diﬀerent characteristics
from discrimination based on recognized categories. Without overstating
the external validity of our results, we believe that this raises important
questions for society and social policy, and merits further research.
22The role of beauty is less suprising in Argentina, where Mobius and Rosenblat’s (2006)
experiment was conducted. Buenos Aires is known as the "plastic surgery capital of the
world".
30
References
[1] Altonji, J.G., and R.M. Blank (1999), Race and Gender in the La-
bor Market, in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor
Economics, Amsterdam: North Holland.
[2] Andreoni, J. and R. Petrie (2004), Beauty, Gender and Stereotypes: Ev-
idence from Laboratory Experiments, University of Wisconsin, Madi-
son, Department of Economics Working Paper 2004-06.
[3] Antonovics, K., P. Arcidiacono and R. Walsh (2005), Games and Dis-
crimination: Lessons From The Weakest Link, Journal of Human Re-
sources 40(4), pp. 918-947.
[4] Becker, G. (1957), The Economics of Discrimination, Chicago Univer-
sity Press, Chicago.
[5] Belot, M., V. Bhaskar and J. van de Ven (2006), Social Preferences in
the Public Arena: Evidence from a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on a TV
show, http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/papers/uploaded/221.pdf.
[6] Belot, M., V. Bhaskar and J. van de Ven (2008), Can Observers Predict
Trustworthiness?, http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/papers/uploaded/298.pdf.
[7] Benjamin, D.J., and J.M. Shapiro (2006), The Rational Voter, Thinly
Sliced: Personal Appeal as an Election Forecaster, mimeo, Harvard
University.
[8] Bertrand, M., D. Chugh and S. Mullainathan (2005), Implicit Discrim-
ination, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 95(2),
94-98.
[9] Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan (2004), Are Emily and Greg more
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination, American Economic Review 94(4), 991-1013.
31
[10] Biddle, J. and D. Hamermesh (1998), Beauty, Productivity, and Dis-
crimination: Lawyers’ Looks and Lucre, Journal of Labor Economics
16(1), 172-201.
[11] Eckel, C. and R. Wilson (2004), Detecting Trustworthiness: Does
Beauty Confound Intuition?, mimeo.
[12] Fershtman, C. and U. Gneezy (2001), Discrimination in a Segmented
Society: An Experimental Approach, Quarterly Journal of Economics
116, 351-377.
[13] Gneezy, U., M. Niederle and A. Rustichini (2003), Performance in com-
petitive environments: Gender diﬀerences, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 118(3), 1049-1074.
[14] Greenwald., A. G., D. McGhee and J.L.K. Schwartz (1998), Measuring
Individual Diﬀerences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association
Test, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74 (6), 1464-80.
[15] Hamermesh, D. and J. Biddle (1994), Beauty and the Labor Market,
American Economic Review 84(5), 1174-1194.
[16] Harrison, G. and J. List (2004), Field Experiments, Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 27, 1009-1055.
[17] Heckman, J. (1998), Detecting Discrimination, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 12(2), 101-116.
[18] Levitt, S. (2004), Testing Theories of Discrimination: Evidence from
Weakest Link, Journal of Law and Economics 47, 431-452
[19] Landry, C., A. Lange, J. List, M. Price and N. Rupp (2006), Toward
an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field
Experiment, Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(2), 747-782.
32
[20] List, J. (2006), Friend or Foe? A Natural Experiment of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, NBER Working Paper 12097.
[21] Mocan, N. and E. Tekin (2006), Ugly Criminals, NBER Working Paper
12019.
[22] Mobius, M. and T. Rosenblat (2006), Why Beauty Matters, American
Economic Review 96(1), 222-235.
[23] Mulford, M., J. Orbell, C. Shatto and J. Stockard (1998), Physical At-
tractiveness, Opportunity, and Success in Everyday Exchange, Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology 103(6), 1565-1593.
[24] Pfann, G. J. Biddle, D. Hamermesh and C. Bosman (2000), Business
Success and Businesses’ Beauty Capital, Economics Letters 67(2), 201-
207.
[25] Solnick, S. and M. Schweitzer (1999), The Influence of Physical At-
tractiveness and Gender on Ultimatum Game Decisions, Oganizational
Behavior and Human Decision Process 79(3), 199-215.
7 Appendix: Instructions
[Translation from Dutch.] Welcome! The experiment lasts for about 90
minutes. During the experiment you will earn points that are worth money.
The exact amount you earn depends on your score and can earn up to about
€20. None of the other participants will know what you earn and all your
answers will be confidential.
How you earn money You will see fragments of a television game
show. You will be asked to predict the choices of contestants. The more
accurate your predictions are, the higher your score and the more money
you earn. Only your own predictions determine your score and not the
predictions made by other participants.
The TV show The game show starts with 5 candidates. In the first
round, the candidates have to answer quiz questions. Their score depends
on the number of questions they answer correctly. At the end of the round,
one candidate is eliminated by the highest-scoring candidate. You will only
see the first round, and your main task is to predict who will be eliminated.
You will see 7 episodes, based on a random selection from all 69 episodes.
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For background information, we also explain the rest of the game show.
You will not see any of this part of the show and do not have to make any
predictions about it. There at two more rounds after the first round, where
again the highest scoring person has to eliminate one of the others. After
these 3 rounds, there are two candidates left. The scores of both candidates
are added. This is the amount of money they will be playing for. Both
players simultaneously decide whether to share or grab. There are three
possible situations. (1) They both share. In this case, they both get half
of the amount of money. (2) One candidate shares and the other does not
share. In this case, the one who does not share gets the whole amount. The
candidate who shares gets nothing. (3) They both do not share. In this
case, nobody wins any money. Before they make their share/grab decisions,
candidates have the opportunity to say something to each other.
Instructions We start by showing the candidates introducing them-
selves. You will see every candidate twice. The first time, there will be no
sound and we ask you to predict the age of the candidates. The second
time, you will see the candidates introducing themselves again, but with
the sound. We ask you to rate the self-confidence of the candidate. You
can do this on a scale from 1 (very low self-confidence) to 7 (very high
self-confidence), taking 4 as the average of all Dutch people. After the in-
troduction of the candidates, you will see the first round of quiz questions.
After the end of the first round, the person with the highest score chooses
which other candidate will be eliminated. At that point, we pause the show,
and we will ask you to predict how likely it is that a certain candidate will
be eliminated.
The way we ask you to do this is as follows. The candidate with the
highest score can choose one out of the four candidates. We ask you to divide
100 points between these four candidates, in proportion to the likelihood that
they will be eliminated. You can divide the 100 points in any way you like,
as long as the total equals 100. You should give more points to a candidate
the more likely you think that this candidate will be eliminated. If you give
100 points to one candidate, this means you are certain that this candidate
will be eliminated. If you give zero points to a candidate, you are certain
that this candidate will not be eliminated. [Several examples were given.]
To summarize, you give more points to a candidate if you think that
candidate is more likely to be eliminated. In total, you allocate 100 points
over the four candidates. For any candidate, you can use any whole number
from 0 to 100 (thus including numbers such as 14, 61, 78 etc.).
Notice that the total number of points should add up to 100. However,
you will not be penalized if the numbers you choose do not add up. If you
allocate less, say only 90 points, we will reallocate the remaining ten points
in the same ratio as your original allocation. If you allocate more points
(say 150 points in total), then we will scale back the points proportionally,
in this case by multiplying your allocation by 2/3.
After filling in your answer sheet we ask you to put it in the envelope on
your table. After you do this, you are not permitted to take it out of the
envelope. Hence, you can not go back to an earlier question.
Your earnings At the end of the experiment, we compare your pre-
dictions to the actual outcomes. You score is higher if your predictions are
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better. The most you can earn per prediction is 4 points and minimum is
0 points (You will see 7 episodes). Every point is worth C=0.75. For every
age prediction within 2 years of the true age, you receive C=0.25. Your con-
fidence ratings have no impact on your score. The amount you earn for the
selection predictions is calculated by the formula below. This formula is
chosen in such a way that it is in your interest to report your true beliefs.
By reporting any other number than what you truly believe, your expected
earnings are decreased. A proof of this can be requested at the end of the
experiment.
Questions? Please ensure yourself that you have understood the in-
structions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait until
somebody comes to you.
Formula of your score Your score is calculated in such a way that it is
best for you to report your best prediction. You do not need to understand
how your score is calculated in order to do well in this experiment. However,
for those who want to understand the details, we explain this below.
Suppose you allocated pi points to candidate i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. If candidate
i is indeed selected to be eliminated, the score for your prediction is:
4− 2(1− pi/100)2 − 2
X
j 6=i
(pj/100)
2.
Your expected score is maximized by reporting what you really believe.
A proof of this can be obtained at the end of the experiment.
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